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Consideration of Socioeconomic Effects
Under NEPA and the EC Directive on
Environmental Impact Assessment
Jacquelyn L. Smitht

As environmental awareness rises around the globe, many
countries are shifting the focus of their environmental policies to
preventive measures. Frequently, such legislation includes environmental assessment of some sort. An environmental impact assessment "attempts to bring together, in a coordinated and public way,
all the environmental effects of a development together with the
views of those affected in such a manner as to inform the mind of
the decision-maker." 1 Environmental assessment legislation does
not require decisionmakers to make the environment their top priority, but it does attempt to ensure that environmental concerns
are considered along with other relevant factors.2
This Comment examines the provisions of the European Economic Community Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of
Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment ("EIA Directive" or "Directive"),' focusing in particular on whether those
performing environmental impact assessments ("EIAs") must consider socioeconomic effects. A similar question arose in the United
States under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA")4 and was answered only after much litigation. The prevailing interpretation of NEPA requires a threshold finding of

t B.A. 1989, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
Nigel Haigh, The EEC Directive on Environmental Assessment of Development
Projects, 1983 J Planning & Envir L 585, 588. See also, Weinberger v Catholic Action of
Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 US 139, 143 (1981), noting that one of the aims of
§ 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC §§ 4321-70a (1988), is "to
inject environmental considerations into the federal agency's decisionmaking process by requiring the agency to prepare an [environmental impact statement]."
See Malcolm Grant, Implementation of the EC Directive on Environmental Impact
Assessment, 4 Conn J Intl L 463, 467 (1989). See also, William V. Kennedy, Environmental
Impact Assessment in North America, Western Europe: What Has Worked Where, How,
and Why, 11 Intl Envir Rptr (BNA) 257 (Apr 13, 1988), discussing EIAs as a mechanism for
"influencing" decisionmakers.
I Council Dir 85/337, 1985 OJ L175:40. The Council adopted the Directive on June 27,
1985.
' 42 USC §§ 4321-70a (1988).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

356

[1992:

"traditional" environmental effects (impacts on the physical environment) to trigger the environmental impact statement ("EIS")
requirement. Since NEPA inspired the EIA Directive, an examination of the United States position on socioeconomic effects is valuable for determining what stance the European Community
("EC") should take.
Part*I of this Comment describes NEPA's major provisions
and shows the evolution and judicial construction of the EIS requirement in the federal courts. Part II explains the EIA Directive's major provisions, briefly describes possible interpretive
methods that the European Court of Justice could use in construing the Directive, and examines the text and history of the Directive. Part III argues that, for policy reasons similar to those discussed by United States courts, the Directive's scope must be
limited. The Comment concludes that environmental impact assessors in the EC should only consider socioeconomic impacts that are
closely related to adverse effects on the physical environment.
I.

THE UNITED STATES: THE EVOLUTION OF

NEPA

Basic Provisions of NEPA

A.

Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act to
establish the prevention of environmental damage as an important
federal goal. The statute has three components: the first proclaims
its environmental purpose and policy;6 the second sets forth the
substantive requirement for an EIS; 7 and the third establishes the
Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ").5
Congress's purpose in enacting NEPA was
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or elim- 42

USC §§ 4321, 4331.

6 42 USC § 4331.

42 USC § 4332.
" 42 USC § 4342. See also, Note, Rejection of Risk Under NEPA: Stress and People
Against Nuclear Energy, 33 Am U L Rev 535, 549 (1984). The CEQ, a body of three presidential appointees, first established guidelines for the implementation of NEPA in the
i970s. At the request of President Carter, the CEQ established mandatory regulations, 40
CFR §§ 1500.1-1517.7 (1991), which took effect July 30, 1979. Section 1508.14 makes clear
that "economic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require preparation of adt
environmental impact statement," although once an EIS is required, such effects are to be
assessed. Oddly, however, although courts cite the regulation, they have not considered it
dispositive. See, for example, Goodman Group, Inc. v Dishroom, 679 F2d 182, 185 (9th Cir
1982).
7
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inate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a
Council on Environmental Quality."

This statement of congressional policy reflects a commitment to
environmental protection, but retains quality of life as a central
concern:
[Ilt is the continuing policy of the Federal Government
. . . to use all practicable means and measures . . . to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans."0
Further goals include ensuring "safe, healthful, productive, and
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings""
and
"preserv[ing] important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage." 2
In order to achieve these goals, all federal agencies must prepare an environmental impact statement for "legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.' 1 3 The Act, which does not define the phrase
"human environment," proved to be fertile ground for lawsuits,
particularly for plaintiffs who claimed agency failure to assess specific effects."' Justice Marshall wrote that the vagueness of the
statute acted as "a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of
15
NEPA.'
Much litigation surrounded the question of whether Congress
intended the phrase "affecting. . .the human environment" to in-

42 USC § 4321.
42 USC § 4331(a).

10

12
13

42 USC § 4331(b)(2).
42 USC § 4331(b)(4).
42 USC § 4332(2)(C).

In fact, NEPA generated over one thousand lawsuits in its first nine years. Grant, 4
Conn J Intl L at 463 (cited in note 2). In NEPA's first thirteen years, 70 agencies prepared
16,000 EISs, resulting in 1,602 lawsuits. Kennedy, 11 Intl Envir Rptr (BNA) at 257 (cited in
note 2).
15 Kleppe v Sierra Club, 427 US 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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clude non-ecological impacts.1" Controversial types of effects include impacts on the quality of urban life, such as increases in vehicular or pedestrian traffic; economic impacts, like rises in
unemployment or increases in local tax bases; aesthetic effects,
such as landscaping considerations; changes in the character of a
community, particularly its racial or class composition; and psychological effects, such as fears of increasing crime rates or possible
nuclear disasters. 17 This Comment uses the term "socioeconomic
effects" to refer to all of these types of impacts collectively."8
B.

NEPA in the Federal Courts

Federal courts quickly realized the limitations of textual interpretation as a means of construing a statute "which has been characterized as 'opaque' and 'woefully ambiguous.' "19 In Hanly v
Mitchell ("Hanly i,,),2o one of the earliest and most anomalous
NEPA decisions, the Second Circuit argued that the term "environment" did not indicate that NEPA applied only to natural habitats or ecological impacts.2 1 Rather,
[NEPA's] aims extend beyond sewage and garbage and
even beyond water and air pollution; [t]he act must be
construed to include protection of the quality of life for
city residents. Noise, traffic, overburdened mass trans-

IS

Note, Psychological Effects at NEPA's Threshold, 83 Colum L Rev 336, 356 (1983)

("almost all litigation on nonecological effects has focused on the treatment to be accorded
socioeconomic effects").
17 These categories are based on those found in Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law &
Litigation: the National Environmental Policy Act 96-110 (Callaghan, 1984). Examples of
effects that fall within these categories also appear in Valerie M. Fogleman, Guide to the
National Environmental Policy Act: Interpretations,Applications, and Compliance § 3.6
at 61-63 (Quorum Books, 1990).
8 See, for example, Mandelker, NEPA Law & Litigation §§ 8.37-8.43 at 90 (cited in
note 17). Mandelker divides socioeconomic effects, as defined by this Comment, into quality
of urban life, inner city decline, growth and development, socioeconomic effects, aesthetic
effects, social and economic class and racial effects, and psychological effects. Id. For convenience, this Comment classifies all such effects as socioeconomic. This approach also reflects
the attitude of the federal courts which have applied the Supreme Court's reasoning in Metropolitan Edison Co. v People Against Nuclear Energy ("PANE"), 460 US 766 (1983), to
effects other than the psychological ones facing the Court. See text at notes 50-55.
19 Hanly v Kleindienst ("Hanly 11"), 471 F2d 823, 825 (2d Cir 1972) (footnotes
omitted).
20

460 F2d 640 (2d Cir 1972).

21

Id at 647.
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portation systems, crime, congestion and even availability
22
of drugs all effect the urban "environment"[.]

Other jurisdictions recognized that, although "human environment" certainly means more than lakes and fields, the term needs
outer limits as well. For example, in Maryland-National Capitol
Park and Planning Commission v United States Postal Service,2 3
the D.C. Circuit examined whether an influx of low-income workers resulting from the Postal Service's construction of a bulk mail
center constituted a cognizable environmental impact. Judge
Leventhal, recognizing the breadth of the Act's language, acknowledged that
Concerned persons might fashion a claim, supported by
linguistics and etymology, that there is an impact from
people pollution on "environment," if the term be
stretched to its maximum. We think this type of effect
cannot fairly be projected as having been within the contemplation of Congress.2 4
Thus, federal courts interpreting the vague language of NEPA
rejected definitions of "environment" that raised problems of
under- and over-inclusiveness. Some courts turned to legislative
history to search for the boundaries that Congress intended. These
courts discovered that
Although the legislative history- indicates Congressional
concern with the "interrelated problems associated with
environmental quality," such as socio-economic impact,
the basic thrust of the Act is the management of this nation's physical surroundings and natural resources.15
In Breckinridge v Rumsfeld,26 the Sixth Circuit relied almost
exclusively on legislative history to support its conclusion that socioeconomic factors fall outside of NEPA's intended range.. The

22

Id. Upon remand, the case was again appealed to the Second Circuit. In Hanly II,

the court restated its earlier position that NEPA covered the "urban environment." 471 F2d
823, 827 (2d Cir 1972) (quoting Hanly I, 460 F2d at 647).
-- 487 F2d 1029 (DC Cir 1973).
24 Id at 1037.
Metlakatla Indian Community v Adams, 427 F Supp 871, 875 (D DC 1977), quoting
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, HR Rep No 91-378, 91st Cong, 1st Sess 3
(1969), reprinted in 2 USCCAN 2751, 2753 (1969)(footnote omitted).
20 537 F2d 864 (6th Cir 1976).
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court quoted Senator Jackson-"[p]robably the most influential
figure in the passage of NEPA"' 7 -extensively:
What is involved is a congressional declaration that we
do not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate
actions which endanger the continued existence or the
health of mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate
actions which will do irreparable damage to the air, land,
and water which support life on earth.2 8
The Breckinridge court concluded from the legislative history
that NEPA's priorities were first the physical, natural environmental effects and only secondarily the socioeconomic ones. Therefore,
in applying the statute, the court distinguished primary (or direct)
from secondary (or indirect) effects. 29 Other jurisdictions soon followed the Sixth Circuit's ruling that socioeconomic considerations
alone were insufficient to trigger NEPA's EIS requirement."
Some commentators believe that these courts' interpretations
of legislative history are flawed. At least one hints that the courts
took Senator Jackson's remarks out of a context that belies the
courts' interpretations. 1 Others point to the "paucity of [legislative history] material" and to the fact that the EIS provision was
"the product of a last-minute compromise," concluding that no cohesive congressional intent existed.32
Perhaps recognizing the limitations of textual and legislative
history analysis, some federal courts simply relied on policy arguments to justify restricting NEPA's scope to physical effects on the
environment. Those courts reasoned that NEPA does not require
27

28

Note, 83 Colum L Rev at 343 (cited in note 16).
Breckinridge, 537 F2d at 866-67, quoting remarks of Senator Jackson, 115 Cong Rec

40416-17 (1969).
11 Id at 866. The court also concluded that prior NEPA cases had in fact reflected this
dichotomy: "Although factors other than the physical environment have been considered,
this has only been done when there existed a primary impact on the physical environment."
Id, citing Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v United States Postal Svc., 516 F2d 378, 388 (2d
Cir 1975); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v Butz, 498 F2d 1314, 1322 (8th Cir
1974); Maryland-National Capitol Park & Planning Commission v United States Post
Ofc., 487 F2d 1029, 1037-38 (DC Cir 1973); and Hanly I, 460 F2d 640, 647 (2d Cir 1972).
10 See, for example, Image of Greater San Antonio, Tex. v Brown, 570 F2d 517 (5th Cir
1978); Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v United States Dept. of Labor, 609 F2d
342 (8th Cir 1979), cert den, 446 US 936 (1980); Township of Dover v United States Postal
Svc., 429 F Supp 295 (D NJ 1977); National Ass'n. of Government Employees v Rumsfeld,
418 F Supp 1302 (E D Pa 1976).
3' Note, 83 Colum L Rev at 356 (cited in note 16) ("[t]aken in isolation, [Jackson's
remarks] could lead to a narrow conception of NEPA").
32 David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 Envir L 551, 560 (1990).
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federal agencies to assess non-quantifiable effects, such as aesthetic, cultural, or psychological impacts, because such factors are
unassessable. In Maryland-National Capitol Park and Planning
Commission v United States Postal Service, 3 the plaintiffs alleged
that the Postal Service failed to assess not only the impact of an
influx of low-income workers, but also the new bulk mail center's
aesthetic impact. The court admitted that NEPA explicitly includes aesthetic effects but realized that requiring agencies to assess aesthetic effects in the absence of a primary ecological impact
would force them to attempt to quantify highly subjective factors
arising in any significant federal project. 4
In Goodman Group, Inc. v Dishroom,35 the Ninth Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit's decision in Maryland-National,acknowledging the confusion that NEPA poses in its treatment of social,
economic, aesthetic, and cultural effects. 36 The court also noted
threshold
that the primary-effect-on-the-physical-environment
"serves [] to confine scarce resources for EIS preparation to those
cases where they are most needed . . . .,, Thus, consideration of
the burden placed on federal agencies by an overinclusive interpretation, of textual ambiguity, and of possible legislative emphasis on
the physical environment led the federal appellate courts to restrict the scope of NEPA.
C.

NEPA in the Supreme Court

The only Supreme Court decision addressing the question of
whether NEPA requires assessment of socioeconomic effects is
Metropolitan Edison Co. v People Against Nuclear Energy
("PANE").8 The Court, making textual, historical, and policy arguments, held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission need not
consider the potential psychological effects of its decision to reopen
the nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island, concluding that "[i]f
a harm does not have a sufficiently close connection to the physical
3' 9
environment, NEPA does not apply.
1

487 F2d 1029 (DC Cir 1973).
" Id at 1038-39. The court thus determined that it need not take a "hard look" at the
Postal Service's actions and found that the agency would in all likelihood pass an "arbitrary
and capricious" review. Id.
35 679 F2d 182 (9th Cir 1982).
36 Id at 185.
'
Id. The court held that the cultural impact of rehabilitating a building-and the
consequent displacement of local artists-fell outside the scope of NEPA.
"8 460 US 766 (1983).
" Id at 778.
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that
NEPA's language expressly covers effects on human health and
conceded that psychological effects fall within that category."'
However, he argued that a literal reading of NEPA is misleading.
Like the lower federal courts, Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he
theme of [the EIS requirement] is sounded by the adjective 'environmental'. . . . [T]he context of the statute shows that Congress
was talking about the physical environment-the world around us,
so to speak." 4 '
The Court also cited legislative history to support its conclusion that the statute was primarily intended to help protect the
physical environment:
[W]e can now move forward to preserve and enhance our
air, aquatic, and terrestrial environments . . . to carry
out the policies and goals set forth in the bill to provide
each citizen of this great country a healthful
environment.2
After reviewing the textual and historical evidence of legislative focus on "air, land and water, '4 3 the Court adopted a requirement of "a reasonably close causal relationship between a change
in the physical environment and the effect at issue. '14 This nexus
requirement adopts and tightens the lower courts' primary-secondary effects dichotomy. After PANE, only those secondary effects
sufficiently linked to a primary impact are cognizable under
NEPA.
The Court justified this narrow interpretation of NEPA's
scope with several policy arguments. First, broadly understood,
"adverse environmental effects" could include almost any consequence of a governmental action that one might fairly label "adverse". 4 5 Such a reading would place an enormous burden on federal agencies, forcing them to prepare EIS's for a much wider
range of their activities. 46 Second, in a case like PANE, requiring
an EIS for psychological impacts would force an agency to spend
40

Id at 771.

41

Id at 772.

42

PANE, 460 US at 773, quoting remarks of Rep. Dingell, 115 Cong Rec 40924 (Dec 22,

1969) (emphasis in original). Representative Dingell introduced a measure similar to NEPA
in the House of Representatives. Note, 83 Colhm L Rev at 343, n 59 (cited in note 16).
4" PANE, 460 US at 773, quoting remarks of Sen Jackson, 115 Cong Rec 40416 (Dec 20,
1969).
Id at 774.
Id at 772.
'6 Shilton, 20 Envir L at 560-61 (cited in note 32).
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its limited resources to hire experts in psychology or to acquire
knowledge of psychology itself, when such expertise is irrelevant to
the duties delegated to it by Congress.4 7 Third, the Court emphasized that the "political process, and not NEPA, provides
the ap4 8
propriate forum in which to air policy disagreements.
The PANE Court's decision that psychological effects are not
cognizable unless closely related to a direct effect on the physical
environment validated the lower courts' distinction between primary and secondary effects.4' Although courts might have interpreted the PANE holding narrowly to apply only to psychological
effects, they have instead cited the PANE dicta frequently in cases
concerning nonpsychological socioeconomic impacts.5 0 Examples of
nonpsychological socioeconomic impacts include a new plastic
container's susceptibility to tampering,5 possible disruption of
telephone communications, 52 a local government's deprivation of
potentially significant tax revenues, 53 and the economic effects of
amending milk price support systems.5 4 Thus, after much litigation, federal courts have concluded that socioeconomic concerns,
unless closely tied to changes in the physical environment, are not
the type of environmental effects that Congress intended impact
assessments consider.
II.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE

A.

Basic Provisions
The primary goal of the European Economic Community
("EC") is to establish free trade among Member States. 5 The EC
" PANE, 460 US at 776.
18 Id at 777.
'9 Note, 33 Am U L Rev at 554 (cited in note 8) ("[with the PANE opinion, the Supreme Court gave authoritative weight to the majority view of NEPA's coverage."). However, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of cognizability of socioeconomic effects. Thus the lower courts and commentators that cite PANE often rely on its
dicta.
50 See, for example, Mall Properties,Inc. v Marsh, 672 F Supp 561, 570 (D Mass 1987),
later proceeding 841 F2d 440 (1st Cir 1988), cert den as New Haven v Marsh, 488 US 848
(1988) ("[PANE] makes it evident that effects unrelated to changes in the physical environment may not be considered under NEPA"); Olmsted Citizens for a Better Community v
United States, 793 F2d 201, 206 (8th Cir 1986) (interpreting PANE broadly).
5' Glass Packaging Institute v Regan, 737 F2d 1083 (DC Cir 1984).
" Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v Dole, 633 F Supp 725 (W D Wash 1986).
" Village of Palatine v United States Postal Svc., 742 F Supp 1377 (N D Ill 1990).
Mulroy Dairy Farms v Block, 569 F Supp 256 (N D NY 1983).
6 See Comment, The European Community in 1992: An Integrated Approach to
Economy and Ecology, 1990 BYU L Rev 1759, 1761. See also, Treaty Est the Eur Eco
Comm, Arts 9-17, 30-36.
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did not perceive a link between trade and ecological concerns until
the 1970s, and, therefore, the Treaty establishing the EC contained
no provisions for regulating the environment.5 Once the EC recognized that environmental concerns affect local economies, it realized that differences in Member State environmental policies could
"create unfavourable competitive conditions.""7
Since the early 1970s, the EC has enacted several environmental "action programmes" and a mass of environmental legislation.5 8
In the environmental field, most EC legislation takes the form of
directives, which prescribe particular ends, but leave the precise
means of implementation to the discretion of the individual Member States.59
The EIA Directive, although inspired by NEPA,60 is substantially different in its focus and structure. Whereas NEPA applies
only to "legislation and other major Federal actions,""' the Directive applies to "public and private projects which are likely to
have significant effects on the environment.""2 Under the Directive, the developer of a project provides information to the appropriate authority responsible for giving "development consent" for
such activities." Assessments make environmental effects6 a4 significant, but not determinative, factor in licensing decisions.
Two annexes list the specific types of projects falling within
the scope of the Directive. Under Article 4 of the Directive, Annex
However, the legal basis for EC environmental legislation was at first found in the
EEC Treaty, despite the fact that it did not even contain the word "environment." See
Stanley P. Johnson and Guy Corcelle, The Environmental Policy of the European Communities 1 (Graham & Trotman, 1989) (basis for environmental legislation found in Articles 2
and 36 of the EEC Treaty). In 1987, as part of the EC's fourth environmental program, the
Treaty was amended to solidify the EC's jurisdiction over environmental policy. Comment,
1990 BYU L Rev at 1766 (cited in note 55). The four successive environmental programs the
EC has adopted are little more than broad statements of environmental goals. Id at 1763-68.
17 Council Dir 85/337, preamble, 1985 OJ at L175:40 (cited in note 3).
"8The action programs are printed at 1973 OJ C112:1; 1977 OJ C139:1; 1983 OJ C46:1;
1987 OJ C328:1. For a good overview of the evolution of the EC's environmental policy, see
Johnson & Corcelle, The Environmental Policy of the European Communities (cited in
note 56).
11 Comment, 1990 BYU L Rev at 1763 (cited in note 55). See also, EEC, Art 189(3). EC
legislation takes one of three forms: regulations, decisions, or directives. Regulations become
part of the Member States' laws without any additional action by the Member State. Decisions are also binding without further action, but are "generally limited to non-routine legislative matters." Comment, 1990 BYU L Rev at 1763.
'o Nigel Haigh, Environmental Assessment-The EC Directive, 1987 J Planning & Envir L 4.
6 NEPA, 42 USC § 4332(2)(C).
62 Council Dir 85/337, art 1(1), 1985 OJ at L175:41 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
6 Id, arts 1, 5, and 8, 1985 OJ at L175:41-42.
04 Grant, 4 Conn J Intl L at 467 (cited in note 2).
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I projects, such as nuclear power reactors and chemical treatment
facilities, presumptively have significant effects on the environment."0 Therefore, the Directive makes environmental assessment
of such projects mandatory."
On the other hand, Annex II projects, which range from coal
extraction to hotel complexes,"7 must be assessed only "where
Member States consider that their characteristics so require.""B Article 4 of the Directive gives Member States the discretion to
"specify certain types of projects as being subject to an assessment
or establish the criteria and/or thresholds necessary to determine"
which Annex II projects will require an EIA.6 9
Article 3 of the Directive specifies that EIAs
will identify, describe and assess . . . the direct and indirect effects of a project on the following factors:
* human beings, fauna and flora,
" soil, water, air, climate and the landscape,
* the inter-action between the factors mentioned in the
first and second indents, [and]
70
* material assets and the cultural heritage.
The vagueness of the EIA Directive raises the question of how
broadly to interpret "environmental effects. '7 1 As in NEPA, the
language of the Directive leaves much room for debate: What does
the Directive mean by "material assets and the cultural heritage?"
Do any and all effects on "human beings" require EIAs?
Clarification of these vague standards is particularly important in light of recent controversies surrounding implementation of
66 Annex I projects include crude oil refineries; nuclear power stations and reactors;
radioactive waste storage or disposal installations; cast-iron and steel melting facilities; asbestos processing plants; integrated chemical installations; transportation facilities including
roads, railroads, and airports; trading ports and inland waterways; and waste incinerators,
chemical treatment facilities, or landfills for dangerous or toxic waste. Council Dir 85/337,
annex I, 1985 OJ at L175:44 (cited in note 3).
6 Id, art 4(1), 1985 OJ at L175:41.
67 Annex II projects fall into twelve categories and numerous subcategories. These
groups include some types of agricultural projects; the extractive industry; installations for
the storage or production of energy; metal processing sites; glass manufacturing plants; the
chemical industry; some "food industry" installations; the textile, leather, wood, and paper
industries; the rubber industry; infrastructure projects of various sorts; miscellaneous other
projects, including hotel complexes, waste water treatment facilities, artificial mineral fiber
producers, and knackers' yards; and modifications to existing Annex I projects. Id, annex II,
1985 OJ at L175:45.
68 Id, art 4(2), 1985 OJ at L175:41-42.
69 Council Dir 85/337, art 4(2), 1985 OJ at L175:41-42 (cited in note 3).
10 Id, art 3, 1985 OJ at L175:41 (emphasis added).
71 Grant, 4 Conn J Intl L at 468 (cited in note 2).
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the EIA Directive. On October 17, 1991, EC Environment Commissioner, Carlo Ripa de Meana, sent letters to ten of the twelve
Member States, alleging that they improperly implemented the Directive." If the Commissioner cannot persuade the Member States
to implement the Directive to his satisfaction, he may commence
proceedings against them in the European Court of Justice, where
the question of the cognizability of socioeconomic impacts might
arise.7 3 Since the spotlight is now on the EIA Directive, clarifying
its scope takes on added importance.
B.

Interpretive Method of the European Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), like United States
courts, realizes the limitations of literal readings of texts and tends
to rely heavily on contextual interpretation.7 - The ECJ is more
policy-oriented than its United States counterparts, however, and
it frequently uses an interpretive method, often called a teleological approach, which construes Community legislation according to
its context and objectives.7 Under this approach, the ECJ "interpret[s] texts on the basis of what it thinks they should be trying to
achieve: it moulds the law according to what it regards as the
needs of the Community. '76 Teleological interpretation, in its extreme form, becomes judicial legislation. This, too, is favored by
the ECJ.77
This predilection for policy arguments makes the European
Court of Justice less amenable to legislative intent arguments. 8
Philip Johnston, EC Chief Accuses Major of Trying to Intimidate Him, Daily Telegraph 2 (Oct 26, 1991)(LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File).
73 Only one case dealing with the EIA Directive has been reported so far. See Browne v
An Bord Pleanala, 1990:1 CMLR 3 (Irish High Court 1989) (Directive is not directly binding on parties that are not "emanations of the state"). Another European case, Case 187/87,
Saarland v Minister of Industry, 1988 ECR 5013, 1989:1 CMLR 529, simply mentions the
Directive in passing. The lack of litigation regarding the Directive is not surprising since the
Member States had until July 3, 1988, to implement it. Council Dir 85/337, art 12(1), 1985
OJ at L175:43 (cited in note 3).
"' The ECJ "looks at the words used and considers their meaning in the context of the
instrument as a whole. In doing this, it tries to give the provision an interpretation which
fits in with the general scheme of the instrument.
...
T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of
European Community Law 58 (Clarendon Press, 1981). See also, L. Neville Brown, ed, The
Court of Justice of the European Communities 271-2 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1989). Note that
Justice Rehnquist also used a contextual interpretation of NEPA in PANE. See text at
notes 36-37.
71 Brown, ed, The Court of Justice at 286 (cited in note 74).
"0Hartley, The Foundationsof European Community Law at 59 (cited in note 74).
77 Id.
71 Id at 58. "Interpretations based on the original situation would in no way be in keeping with a Community law oriented towards the future." Id at 59, n 54, citing H. Kutscher,
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Another reason why the ECJ "makes little attempt to establish the
actual subjective intention of the authors of the text" 9 is that EC
legislation is often the result of "hard bargaining."80 Realizing that
often no community intent underlies EC legislation, the ECJ considers the role of authors of treaties or legislation as limited to the
enactment of the text.8 After the authors enact a piece of legisla'' 2
tion, the ECJ becomes "the custodian of their common will. 8
Drafters' intent becomes irrelevant: discerning the meaning of a
text requires only the enacted language and the interpretive powers of the judiciary. Thus, while legislative history arguments
seemed to persuade United States courts construing the scope of
NEPA, similar arguments based on the drafting history of the Directive are unlikely to succeed in the EC.
C.

Statutory Analysis

Applying the ECJ's contextual interpretive method to the EIA
Directive helps to clarify its generally vague provisions. On its face,
Article 4 of the Directive appears to give Member States complete
discretion to establish criteria for determining which Annex II
projects require EIAs. Were this reading correct, each Member
State could determine whether socioeconomic impacts should be
assessed for Annex II projects. However, Article 4 must be read in
conjunction with Article 2, which sets out the Member States' primary duty under the Directive:
Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that . . . projects likely to have significant effects on
the environment by virtue . . . of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment ... .
The Directive thus requires that any criteria or thresholds
proposed by Member States must still ensure that appropriate environmental effects are assessed. Further, the Directive contemplates that thresholds will be determined by the characteristics of
the project-its "nature, size, or location"-rather than by the

Methods of Interpretationas Seen by a Judge of the Court of Justice 22 (paper presented
to the Judicial and Academic Conference at the European Court in 1976).
" Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law at 58 (cited in note 74).
80 Brown, The Court of Justice at 279 (cited in note 74).
"' Id at 277.
'2 Id, quoting Robert Lecourt, former President of the European Court of Justice, Geneva Lectures, Le juge devant le Marche Commun (1970).
13 Council Dir 85/337, art 2(1), 1985 OJ at L175:41 (cited in note 3).
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types of effects likely to occur.8 4 Indeed, for some Annex II
projects, "thresholds are built into the description."8 5 Stated another way, the Directive raises two separate questions: Does a particular project require an EIA? If so, what effects must be assessed? Thus, regardless of the particular Article 4(2) criteria they
establish, Member States must still determine whether socioeconomic effects are to be assessed.8 6
The ECJ often uses legislative preambles to assist it in interpreting Community laws. 7 The EIA Directive's preamble refers to
environmental action programs of 1973, 1977, and 1983, that
"stress that the best environmental policy consists in preventing
the creation of pollution or nuisances at source .. ."88 It also lists
as "one of the Community's objectives . . . protection of the environment and the quality of life."8 9 The goals of environmental assessment as stated in the Preamble are
to protect human health, to contribute by means of a
better environment to the quality of life, to ensure maintenance of the diversity of species and to maintain the
reproductive capacity of the ecosystem as a basic resource for life.90
Thus, the language of the Preamble reflects a fundamental
concern for ecological impact and human health. However, vague
terms like "quality of life" and Article 3's "direct and indirect effects [on] human beings [and on] material assets and the cultural
heritage" still leave room for the argument that developers and licensing authorities must consider socioeconomic impacts.
The only other section of the Directive that indicates what
types of effects are to be considered is Annex III, which sets out
Id.
11 Grant, 4 Conn J Intl L at 465 (cited in note 2). For example, airport runways of less
than 2100 meters fall within Annex II, not Annex I. Council Dir 85/337, annex II(10)(d),
1985 OJ at L175:46 (cited in note 3).
"OThe Commissioner's actions also might imply that Member States do not enjoy total
discretion to control what projects are to be assessed. Among the charges levelled against
the United Kingdom is the allegation that "UK legislation gives too much discretion to the
competent authorities to decide whether for Annex II projects an assessment should be required." Commission of the European Communities, Opening of Infringement Proceedings
Against the United Kingdom in Respect of the Implementation of Directive 85/337/EEC
on Environmental Impact Assessment RAPID (Oct 17, 1991) (LEXIS, Europe Library,
Allnws File).
,7Brown, ed, The Court of Justice at 279 (cited in note 74).
11 Council Dir 85/337, preamble, 1985 OJ at L175:40 (cited in note 3).
84

ag Id.
'0 Id.
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the information developers must provide to licensing authorities.
The description of the project should include estimates of "expected residues and emissions (water, air, and soil pollution, noise,
vibration, light, heat, radiation, etc.).""' This language suggests
that the Directive's primary concern is pollution prevention. However, Annex III, section 3, contains a much broader list of "aspects
of the environment likely to be significantly affected. 92 These include "population, fauna, flora, soil, water, air, climatic factors,
material assets, including the architectural and archaeological heritage, landscape, and the inter-relationship between the above factors.""3 Thus, section 3 expands the first section's focus, suggesting
that perhaps more than physical effects fall within the Directive's
scope.
The language of Annex III also provides some assistance. The
Annexhelps clarify what the Directive's drafters meant by "material assets," which otherwise could be interpreted extremely
broadly. The words "architectural and archaeological heritage"
suggest that the EC might have meant the built-up environment
characterized by some type of cultural, historical, or aesthetic
value. Annex III does not contemplate the assessment of effects on,
for example, cars or coins.
While Article 3 requires assessment of effects on "human beings," the "aspects of the environment likely to be affected" listed
in Annex III do not include human beings, but do include "population. ' 94 The distinction between "human beings" and "population"
has never been clarified. Effects on human health are clearly cognizable under the Preamble, but do such effects include increasing
crime rates or changes in a community's demography? "Human
beings" and "population" have different connotations, but because
these distinctions can cut many ways, a comparison of their meanings fails to clarify what effects fall within the scope of the Directive. Contextual analysis of the language of the Directive thus offers relatively little assistance in determining what environmental
effects should be assessed.

9' Id, annex 111(1), 1985 OJ at L175:48.
council Dir 85/337, Id, annex 111(3), 1985 OJ at L175:48 (cited in note 3).
93

Id.

"' Id, art. 3, annex III, 1985 OJ at L175:41, 48.
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D. Drafting History
The ECJ disfavors arguments based on drafters' intent."e
However, since some evidence of the evolution of the EIA Directive
is available,9 an examination of the changes from earlier drafts
and opinions may shed light on possible interpretations of the Directive. Unfortunately, this approach is of limited help in determining whether EIAs must include socioeconomic effects.
In 1980, the EC Commission published a draft version of the
Directive ("Draft Directive"), 97 its twenty-first such version.98 In
the Draft Directive, Article 3 provides that EIAs:
shall consider the effects of projects on
0 water, air, soil, climate, flora, fauna and their
interrelationships;
* the built-up environment, including the architectural
heritage, and the landscape.99
The final version of the Directive adds "human beings" to the
first set of factors and substitutes "material assets and the cultural
heritage" for the draft's second set of factors.100 Furthermore, the
final Directive completely omits a second subsection to Article 3,
which read "(2) The effects on these resources shall be assessed by
reference to the need to protect and improve human health and
living conditions as well as to preserve the long term productive
capacities of the resources. ' 101
"'

See text at notes 74-82.

The European Commission and Council publish neither their debates nor most of
their working documents. However, available materials include a draft directive on environmental assessments, the Economic and Social Committee's and the European Parliament's
responses to that draft, written questions to the Commission concerning the Directive, a
subsequent amendment, and secondary reports of possible future amendments. Some commentators view the preamble to EC legislation as part of the document's history. See, for
example, Brown, ed, The Court of Justice at 279 (cited in note 74). However, since the EEC
Treaty requires the Council to set forth in a preamble its reasons for adopting the legislation, preambles are actually evidence of the intent of the enacting Council. EEC, Art 190.
This Comment treats the Directive's preamble as part of an enacted text, similar to Congress's official statements of purpose and policy, NEPA, 42 USC §§ 4321, 4331 (1988), and
not as a preparatory document or extraneous explanation.
97 Commission Prop for Council Dir Concerning the Assessment of the Environmental
Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects ("Draft Directives"), 1980 OJ C169:14.
98 Grant, 4 Conn J Intl L at 464 (cited in note 2). For a good overview of the evolution
of the Directive, see Nigel Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and Britain 352-54 (Longman, 2d rev ed 1990).
" Draft Directive, art 3(1), 1980 OJ at C169:15 (cited in note 97) (emphasis added).
100 Council Dir 85/337, art 3, 1985 OJ at L175:41 (cited in note 3).
'0'Draft Directive, art 3(2), 1980 OJ at C169:15 (cited in note 97).
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The Commission submitted the Draft Directive to both the
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament for
comments. The Committee's opinion was that the Draft Directive
"lays down the common principles on which the assessment should
be based, viz. protection of human health, the safeguard of living
conditions and preservation of natural resources." 10' The Committee noted its concern that
[E]ven when read in conjunction with Annex [III] ...
certain expressions, such as "significant effects" and
"substantial changes," may give rise to difficulties of interpretation and result in dispute that could cause harmful delays in the determination of planning
applications. 103
The Committee also urged that Article 3 more clearly make "man
. . . the point of departure for the assessment of the effects of
projects . .1.0."04
The amendments suggested by the European Parliament propose that the Directive define "environment" as "the physical
human environment."1 0 5 This language resembles United States
courts' narrow reading of NEPA more than the broad language of
the Draft or final Directive.
Since the Directive's adoption, the Commission has proposed
only one amendment to the final Directive; this proposed amendment would merely require EIAs for projects likely to affect a
"special protection area," such as a conservation site. 0 6 Other
sources have reported the possibility of future amendments to
broaden the Directive's scope. 0 7 However, the Commission in 1990
indicated that the only amendment under consideration related to
agricultural projects. 10 8
The Directive's drafting history is too sketchy and inconclusive to clarify what is meant by the final, enacted text. Typical of
and Social Committee, European Parliament Opinion on the Proposal for
a Council Directive Concerning the Assessment of the Environmental Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects, 1981 OJ C185:8.
101 Economic

103

Id at 10.

104

Id.

105 1982 OJ C66:76, 79.

Commission Prop for a Council Dir on the Protection of Natural and Semi-natural
Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, preamble, 1988 OJ C247:3.
107 See, for example, Measure Aims to Strengthen Enforcement of EC Directive on
Environmental Assessment, 14 Intl Envir Rptr (BNA) 46 (Jan 30, 1991).
100 Answer to Written Question No 1503/90 by Mr. Gianfranco Amendola, et al. to the
Commission of the European Communities, 1990 OJ C312:42.
1'0
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the European Commission and Council, the drafting history is
manifestly incomplete. Their debates are secret,"'9 and, thus, the
most direct route to the real intent of the drafters, assuming such
community intent exists, is blocked.
The drafting documents and other governmental bodies' opinions also leave many questions unanswered. For example, the final
text substitutes "human beings" for the omitted subsection of Article 3, but the Directive does not indicate why. Is the enacted language broader or narrower than the words it replaced, or their
equivalent? Does the change reflect the Committee's suggestion
that man be the "point of departure?" Similarly, what does the
switch from "built-up environment" to "material assets and the
cultural heritage" mean? Was it an attempt to define "environment" as "the physical human environment," as the European
Parliament desired? The drafting history of the Directive reveals
nothing about the drafters' intended scope.
III.

NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE

EIA

DIRECTIVE

Because the Directive's language and drafting history fail to
clarify the sorts of environmental effects the Commission intended
EIS's to consider, policy arguments must help define the Directive's scope. As noted above, the ECJ is much more willing than
the United States Supreme Court to base its decisions on policy in
order to resolve textual ambiguities.1 10
Clearly, the broadest reading of "environment," even with the
qualifiers "human beings" and "material assets and the cultural
heritage," would place a draconian burden on developers and decisionmakers, as the United States Supreme Court realized in
PANE.1 1 Nearly any project, especially ones such as those listed
in the two Annexes, will produce some effect on people and places.
Such an interpretation would realize the Economic and Social
Committee's fear of "harmful delays in the determination of planning applications.""' 2 In addition, allowing non-environmental concerns to creep into decisionmaking under the banner of environmentalism unnecessarily complicates the task of licensing. The EC
may also desire to exclude effects that are difficult to quantify, as
'09 Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law at 58 (cited in note 74).
1,' Id at 59. See Part II B of this Comment. See also, Brown, The Court of Justice at
290 (cited in note 74).
...Metropolitan Edison Co. v People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 US 766, 776 (1983).
"I Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive,
1981 OJ at C185:10 (cited in note 102).
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these, too, may be unduly burdensome to developers and authorities. Efficiency and manageability require some limitation on the
scope of applicability.
Further, as the PANE court noted, assessing some types of effects requires particular expertise in, for example, psychology or
sociology.113 Developers are even less likely than federal agencies to
have such abilities or to be able to acquire them, and local licensing bodies are probably unaccustomed to considering such information. Moreover, the Directive makes clear that developers need
not obtain such technical knowledge." 4 The scope of cognizable
impacts must be narrowed to take into account the limited expertise of developers and licensing authorities.
Allowing the inclusion of still other types of impacts runs the
risk of admitting social or political choices of national importance
into what are often local licensing decisions. Decisions that should
be left to national or supranational political processes, such as
whether to use nuclear power, might be preempted at the local licensing level, as opponents pressure authorities to require information from developers and to consider any and all possible effects of
nuclear projects. Decisionmakers must hear opposing viewpoints,
but some debates are more appropriately conducted in the national
legislature, not the local planning authority's office. The Directive,
like NEPA, seeks to protect the physical environment. Those with
non-environmental objections to a particular development should
not be able to use the Directive as a means of delaying the project.
The scope of the Directive must be narrowed in some way to ameliorate these problems.
A strict textual interpretation of the Directive might prohibit
using the United States federal courts' distinction between primary and secondary impacts. Article 3 requires assessment of direct and indirect effects, and Annex III mandates that developers'
descriptions of the effects of their projects include "direct effects
and any indirect, secondary . . . effects of the project."' 1'

How-

ever, defining "environment" narrowly will not displace the provisions of Article 3 and Annex III. Instead, under such an interpretation, Article 3 and Annex III might require assessments for only
n3 PANE, 460 US at 776.
1.4Article 5(2) and Annex III set forth the types of information the developer must

provide. Although these lists require a great deal from developers, Article 5(1)(b) and Annex
111(7) provide some relief. Annex 111(7) allows developers to indicate "technical deficiencies
or lack of know-how" when providing information to authorities, and Article 5(1)(b) directs

Member States to take into account "current knowledge and methods of assessment."
"' Council Dir 85/337, annex 111(4) n 1, 1985 OJ at L175:48 (cited in note 3).
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those projects that affect the physical environment directly or indirectly. This interpretation permits a restriction on the Directive's
scope like that created by the United States Supreme Court in
PANE for NEPA.
Further, application of the ECJ's teleological approach" 6 also
leads to a conclusion that the Directive's focus must be narrowed.
As discussed in Part II, the statutory language and drafting history
of the Directive display a primary concern for ecological impacts.,
Focusing the assessment requirement on physical, environmental
impact thus comports with the general tenor of the Directive.
Once local authorities determine that an EIA is needed, a
broader range of impacts should also be assessed." 8 However, the
EC should follow the United States Supreme Court's nexus requirement: the Directive should not sweep into the decisionmaking
effects that are not closely linked to a physical environmental impact. Such effects will rarely be "significant" and will thus fall
outside the Directive's range of application. If the effects do not
satisfy the nexus requirement but are still "significant," the licensing authorities' should address them independently, rather than
under the Directive. The Directive was not intended to restrict
what the authorities can consider; rather, its purpose was to clarify
one type of factor they must consider.
The [EIA] Directive does not cut across the right of
Member States to exercise political, social, and economic
judgments in their broadest sense; its effect is limited to
increasing the significance of environmental effects in the
decision-making process."'
Application of these limitations will clarify the developers'
tasks under the Directive. Difficult questions will remain, but
clearer requirements will reduce the number of potential claims of
insufficient assessments. A focus on the physical environment, covering ecological effects, impacts on the built-up environment with
special significance, and damage to human health will effectuate
the Directive's goals of protecting the environment and improving
the quality of human life.

,,
"

See text at notes 75-77.
See Parts II C-D of this Comment.

,1 This will place little additional financial burden on developers and licensing authorities, since "the costs involved in impact assessments generally constitute a very small percentage of the total cost of a project, of the order of 0.25% to 0.75%." Johnson & Corcelle,
Environmental Policy of the European Communities at 255 (cited in note 56).
"I

Grant, 4 Conn J Intl L at 467 (cited in note 2).
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CONCLUSION

The EC Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment was modeled after
the United States' National Environmental Policy Act. Despite significant differences between the two statutes, an analysis of the
evolution of what "environmental effects" have been considered by
United States courts as sufficient to trigger NEPA's EIS requirement is valuable for Member States and developers interpreting
the Directive. In the face of ambiguous statutory language and inconclusive drafting history, interpreters of the Directive should
look to the policy arguments made by United States courts.
These ambiguities suggest that the EC should seriously consider amending the Directive so that Member States will not attempt to use it as a panacea to force decisionmakers to consider all
social problems in their licensing or land-use planning decisions.
Local decisionmakers must consider factors other than the impact
on the physical environment. However, the Directive, like NEPA,
will be more efficient and truer to its original purpose if interpreted narrowly. The Directive should not deter construction and
economic development, nor should it let projects go forward without prior consideration of their effects on those aspects of our environment that are too often overlooked.

